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Criminal Law-COMPREHENSIVE DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION A D 
CONTROL ACT OF  PERSONS WHO SIMULTANEOUSLY ACQUIRE 
JOINT POSSESSION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE FOR ILLEGAL PER- 
SONAL USE ARE NOT GUILTY OF FELONIOUS POSSESSION WITH 
"INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE"- United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 
445 (2d Cir. 1977). 
Walter Swiderski, Swiderski's fiancee Maritza De Los San- 
tos, and Martin Charles Davis, a government informer, met with 
a narcotics dealer in a prearranged rendezvous to purchase co- 
caine. In the presence of Davis and the dealer, Swiderski and De 
Los Santos each sampled or "snorted" the cocaine. Swiderski 
then paid the dealer $1,250 and pocketed the newly purchased 
packet of cocaine.' Shortly thereafter, federal drug enforcement 
officers arrested both Swiderski and De Los Santos; a search 
revealed that the packet of cocaine was in De Los Santos' posses- 
sion. 
Swiderski and De Los Santos were convicted in federal dis- 
trict court of felonious2 possession of cocaine with "intent to dis- 
t r i b ~ t e . " ~  On appeal,4 the defendants presented an issue of first 
impression to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, i .e.,  whether a joint possessor who passes a jointly pur- 
chased drug to a fellow joint possessor may be considered a 
"distributor" under 21  U.S.C. sections 802 and 841. The Second 
Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that joint possessors who 
simultaneously acquire possession of a drug for their own use 
cannot be guilty of distributing that same drug to each other? 
1. As is common in most cases of illegal possession of narcotics, the quantity sold was 
diluted. The defendants purchased 21.5 grams of a substance containing 4.1 grams of pure 
cocaine. United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 447 (2d Cir. 1977). 
For an analysis of the weights and measures employed in cocaine drug traffic, see 
McLaughlin, Cocaine: The History and Regulation of a Dangerous Drug, 58 CORNELL . 
REV. 537, 548 n.78 (1973). 
2. Compare 21 U.S.C. 5 841(b)(l)(A) (1970) with 18 U.S.C. § l(1) (1970). 
3. 548 F.2d at 447. Possession with intent to distribute violates 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) 
(1970). 
4. This was the second time the Second Circuit had reviewed the convictions of 
Swiderski and De Los Santos. Their first appeal, United States v. Swiderski, 539 F.2d 854 
(2d Cir. 1976), resulted in reversal of their convictions for errors in jury instructions 
regarding entrapment. At retrial, the defendants were reconvicted of "possession of co- 
caine with intent to distribute," and they initiated this second appeal. 548 F.2d at 447. 
5. Id. at 450. The joint possessors could be convicted of the misdemeanor of posses- 
sion of a controlled substance. 
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In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act,"eplacing over fifty diverse federal 
narcotics statutes.? For the first time, all federal drug laws were 
revised and consolidated into one statute providing a balanced 
and consistent approach in the overall federal drug enforcement 
scheme .8 
Significant congressional policies, important to an effective 
analysis of the instant case, underlay passage of the Act. In enact- 
ing the 1970 law, Congress drew a distinction between drug offen- 
ses involving "others" and offenses involving only illicit 
"personal" drug use? In the case of personal drug abuse, Congress 
sought to avoid severly punishing the individual drug user; under 
the Act, illegal possession of a controlled substance for personal 
use became a misdemeanor.1° But where drug abuse involved 
"others," there was a manifest congressional effort to stiffen the 
law and deter all illegal movement of drugs between people by 
broadening the definition of those subject to felony prosecution. 
The 1970 law broadened the scope of felony punishment by 
making it turn on the concept of distribution rather than on the 
narrower pre-Act concepts of purchase and sale.ll The Act de- 
clared any "distributor" of illicit drugs to be guilty of a felony.12 
6. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified in relevant part at 21 U.S.C. §§ 
801-966 (1970)). 
7. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [I9701 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4571 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. 
For a brief commentary on most of the pre-1970 narcotics control laws, see McLaugh- 
lin & Quinn, The Evolution of Federal Drug Control Legislation, 22 CATH. L. REV. 586 
(1973); Katz, Possession of Narcotic Drugs Under State and Federal Statutes, 25 U. MIAMI 
L. REV. 306 (1971). 
8. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 1, reprinted at 4567. A Uniform Controlled Sub- 
stances Act, modeled after the 1970 federal law, has been made available for state adop- 
tion in an attempt to harmonize federal and state drug laws. See 31 COMMI~TEE ON SUG- 
GESTED STATE LEGISLATION, THE C o u ~ c a  OF S T A ~  GOVERNMENTS: 1972 SUGGESTED STATE 
LEGISLATION 220-21 (1971). The Uniform Act has been adopted in most states. See CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE Div. 10 app., at 160 (West 1975). 
9. The House Report states that "possession of controlled drugs is made a misde- 
meanor, except where the possession is for the purpose of distribution to others. " HOUSE 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 4, reprinted a t  4570 (emphasis added). 
The House Report also observes that the "quantity of a drug found in the possession 
of a person, of course, bears upon the question of whether or not his possession is for his 
own use, or is for the purpose of illicit transactions involving others, for which much more 
severe penalties are provided." Id. at 11, reprinted at 4577 (emphasis added). 
10. 21 U.S.C. $844(a) (1970). First offenders may be sentenced to one year in prison, 
fined up to $5,000, or both. Id. 
11. See United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1973). 
12. 21 U.S.C. 8 841 (1970). 
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Congress characterized a "distributor" to be a person who 
"delivers a controlled substance" to another.13 The word 
"deliver" was defined as "the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled sub~tance ."~~ Hence, anyone who actually 
or constructively delivered or transferred a controlled substance 
was a "distributor," and such a delivery or transfer constituted a 
felonious "distrib~tion."~~ These prohibitions of illegal distribu- 
tion of drugs to others represented a distinct change from the pre- 
1970 drug laws that generally made only sale of drugs a felony; 
under the earlier laws, purchase of drugs was usually only a mis- 
demeanor .I6 
The law's shift can also be seen in congressional intent to 
preclude the use of the judicially created procuring agent defense 
that had developed under the pre-1970 drug laws.17 Since the 
earlier laws turned on concepts of illegal sale and purchase, an 
accused seller could escape felony punishment if it were shown 
that he merely acted as a "procuring agent" for the ultimate drug 
purchaser.18 Such an "agent," like his buyer principal, was sub- 
ject only to misdemeanor punishment. In enacting the 1970 law, 
Congress expressly rejected this judicially created defense? 
Congressional intent to severely punish distributors can also 
be inferred from the following hypothetical found in the House 
Report on the 1970 Act: 
Suppose for instance that six young men attending college re- 
side together in a cooperative boarding house. All of them have 
engaged in the practice of smoking marijuana cigarettes and 
there has been, on a day or more, free exchange between them 
of such forbidden drug. Each incident of giving a marijuana 
cigarette to another constitutes a felony.20 
13. Id. $ 802(11). 
14. Id. 8 802(8). 
15. Illegal distribution is punishable by a prison term of up to 15 years, a fine up to 
$25,000, or both. Id. § 841(b). 
16. See United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Hernandez, 480 F.2d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 1973). 
17. See United States v. Marquez, 511 F.2d 62, 64 (10th Cir. 1975). 
18. United States v. Masullo, 489 F.2d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. 
Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1973). 
19. 21 U.S.C. § 802(8) (1970); see United States v. Hernandez, 480 F.2d 1044, 1046 
(9th Cir. 1973). 
20. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 84, reprinted a t  4651 (emphasis added). 
This hypothetical was part of an amendment submitted by Congressman John Din- 
gel1 of Michigan. The amendment did not specifically deal with the issue raised in the 
instant case but rather with a crime entitled "continuing criminal enterprise." See 21 
U.S.C. 5 848 (1970). 
The hypothetical's language indicates that Congress assumed that the passing of 
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Although the final verson of the Act made the gratuitous distribu- 
tion of small amounts of marijuana only a mi~derneanor,~' the 
distribution of small amounts of any other illicit drug, whether 
or not remuneration was received, was still a felony. 
Although Congress failed to define the term "possession" in 
the 1970 Act, the courts have interpreted it to include actual, 
constructive, and joint posse~sion.~~ In narcotics cases, actual pos- 
session exists when a person knowingly controls contraband that 
is on his person.23 When two or more persons share actual posses- 
sion of contraband, their possession is termed "joint actual pos- 
se~sion."~' Actual or joint actual possession need not be estab- 
lished for a person to be guilty of posse~sion;~~ constructive pos- 
session of drugs is sufficient .26 A constructive possessor is a person 
who has dominion and control over a quantity of drugs even 
though they are on another's person or in another locale.27 A joint 
drugs between the hypothetical's characters would be a felonious distribution. The hypo- 
thetical was authored before the criminal penalty for gratuitous distribution of small 
amounts of marijuana was reduced to a misdemeanor; this fact explains the hypothetical's 
characterization of such distributions as felonies rather than misdemeanors. 
21. See 21 U.S.C. $ 841(b)(4) (1970); H.R. REP. NO. 91-1603, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, 
reprinted in [I9701 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4660; R. BOGOMOLNY, M. SONNENREICH, 
& A. ROCCOGRANDI, A HANDBOOK OF THE 1970 FEDERAL DRUG ACT 95 (1975). 
22. E.g., United States v. Nichols, 401 F. Supp. 1377, 1381-82 (E.D. Mich. 1975): 
While the term "possession" is not statutorily defined, it has been uniformly 
construed to include "constructive" possession . . . . Thus it is not necessary 
to a conviction for possession under $ 841(a)(l) that the defendant have actual, 
physical custody of the controlled substance, but only that it be possessed by 
someone under his power or influence. 
23. See, e.g., United States v. Wynn, 544 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1977); Comment, 
Possession of Narcotics in Pennsylvania: "Joint" Possession, 76 DICK. L. REV. 499, 507 
(1972). 
24. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640, 642-43 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975); Comment, Possession of Narcotics in Pennsylvania: "Joint" 
Possession, 76 DICK. L. REV. 499, 509 (1972). 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Gomez, 529 F.2d 412, 419 (5th Cir. 1976). 
26. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 548 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1977) (defendant in 
constructive possession even though marijuana was not on his person or in his presence 
at time of arrest); United States v. Cortwright, 528 F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1975) (defendant 
convicted of distribution although no actual possession was shown); United States v. 
Padilla, 525 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1975) (defendants guilty of possession with intent to distrib- 
ute even though they never physically possessed the drugs). 
27. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 548 F.2d 542, 544 (5th Cir. 1977); United 
States v. Craig, 522 F.2d 29, 32 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. Watkins, 519 F.2d 294, 
298 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640,642-44 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975). This definition is commonly referred to as the "dominion and 
control" test. See United States v. Watkins, 519 F.2d 294, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United 
States v. Bethea, 442 F.2d 790, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For a critique of the dominion and 
control test and an in-depth review of the various state definitions of constructive posses- 
sion, see Whitebread & Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases: To Have and 
Have Not, 58 VA. L. REV. 751, 759 n.26 (1972). 
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constructive possessor, then, is one who shares sufficient domin- 
ion and control over a drug although he does not have actual 
posses~ion.~~ 
Although both De Los Santos and Swiderski were charged 
with "possession of a controlled substance with intent to distrib- 
ute," the real issue in the case centered on the definition of 
"distribution," i. e., whether a statutory distribution was possible 
between two defendants who jointly acquired possession of drugs. 
Arguably, a distribution between the jointly purchasing defend- 
ants was incongruous with the congressional intent and statu- 
tory language of the 1970 Act.2g 
Accepting this argument, the court held that "where two 
individuals simultaneously and jointly acquire possession of a 
drug for their own use, intending only to share it together, their 
only crime is . . . simple joint posses~ion."~~ In the court's view, 
a statutory distribution within the Act's purview was impossible 
among joint possessors as long as the above two criteria were met: 
the joint possessors must have acquired possession of the drugs 
simultaneously, and the joint possessors must have intended to 
use the drugs exclusively for their own personal use.31 
In the absence of any case precedent,32 the court relied on the 
legislative history for primary guidance in rendering the instant 
holding. Quoting the House Report on the 1970 Act to the effect 
that Congress intended to restrain the distribution of controlled 
substances to "others" through imposition of felony punish- 
ment,33 the court reasoned that by "others" Congress meant third 
parties not already involved in the original possession and con- 
cluded that Congress had not intended to punish joint purchasers 
28. Johnson v. United States, 506 F.2d 640,642 n.4 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
US.  978 (1975): "The law recognizes also that possession may be sole or joint. If one 
person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or 
more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint." See 
Comment, Possession of Narcotics in Pennsylvania: "Joint" Possession, 76 DICK. L. REV. 
499, 509 (1972): "[Jloint possession describes the situation where more than one person 
have simultaneously the power to control and the intent to control a common object. . . . 
[Jloint possession in practice denotes simply constructive possession by several persons 
at once." 
29. Brief for Appellant Walter Swiderski at 16-23, United States v. Swiderski, 548 
F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1977). 
30. 548 F.2d a t  450. 
31. Id. at 450-51. 
32. Id. a t  447. 
33. Id. at 450. 
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for illegal distribution solely because they shared a controlled 
substance among them~elves.~' Since the defendants did not 
"transfer" possession of the controlled substances to any 
"others," congressional intent was deemed to be satisfied and no 
statutory distribution to have occurred.35 
In reaching its holding in the instant case, the court created 
a new test to determine whether a statutory distribution had 
taken place. According to the court, if one serves as a "link in the 
chain of distribution" to another, a "distribution" has occurred.36 
Applying this test, the court concluded that since both defend- 
ants jointly acquired possession at  the outset, neither could 
serve as a "link in the chain of distribution" to the other. Accord- 
ing to this logic, a person can be considered a distributor only 
when he has effectively served as a "link in the chain of distribu- 
tion" of drugs to another person not already involved in the origi- 
nal posse~sion.~~ 
The instant case represents the first time a federal court has 
held that although drugs were passed between two individuals, no 
statutory distribution occurred. To evaluate this holding, this 
Case Note will analyze the legislative intent behind passage of 
the 1970 Act and explore the holding's potential impact in light 
of the court's opinion. 
The holding in the instant case was based almost exclusively 
on the court's interpretation of language found in the House Re- 
port on the 1970 law. Analysis of congressional intent, however, 
may justifiably lead to a conclusion contrary to the court's hold- 
ing. While no single argument may compel such a contrary hold- 
ing, the arguments considered as a whole may justify a conclusion 
antithetical to that of the court. 
A search of the House Report, the House and Senate commit- 
tee hearings and floor debates, and the Act's language itself re- 
veals no statement recognizing a single situation where controlled 
drugs could be passed between individuals without statutory dis- 
tribution occurring. In fact, while drafting the marijuana amend- 
ment, Congress declined a clear opportunity to declare that the 
passing of marijuana between individuals for no remuneration 
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would not be a statutory distribution. Rather than alter the defi- 
nition of distribution to accommodate such transfers, Congress 
instead altered the law's penalty structure by lessening the pun- 
ishment to that of a mi~derneanor.~~ Congress could just as easily 
have declared that a gratuitous transfer of a small amount of 
marijuana to another person was not a statutory distribution. 
Congress chose, however, to define such distributions as misde- 
meanors rather than recognize a situation where the movement 
of drugs between individuals would not be a d i s t r ib~t ion .~~ In 
fact, the statutory language of the marijuana amendment specifi- 
cally recognized that the passing of a small amount of marijuana 
for no remuneration was still to be considered a statutory distri- 
b~tion.~O 
In addition, the House Report hypothetical suggested that 
"each incident of giving a marijuana cigarette to anotherxonsti- 
tutes a felony."41 This hypothetical, drafted before consideration 
of the marijuana amendment and not addressed by the court in 
the instant case," is an illustration that Congress considered the 
mere passing of a drug to another to be a distribution deserving 
a felony penalty. 
The facts of the House Report hypothetical and the instant 
case are strikingly similar but the results are inconsistent. Both 
involve the exchange of drugs between joint possessors43 for no 
remuneration. Both involve participants who share a close asso- 
ciation. The characters in the hypothetical were distributors- 
guilty of a felony; the court adjudged the defendants to be mere 
possessors-guilty of a misdemeanor. 
With the court stating that the defendants would be pun- 
38. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(4) (1970) (emphasis added): "[Alny person who violates 
subsection (a) of this section by distributing a small amount of marijuana for no remuner- 
ation shall be treated as provided in sections (a) and (b) of section 844 of this title." 
39. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1603, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [I9701 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4660. 
40. See id. 
41. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 84, reprinted a t  4651; see note 20 and accompany- 
ing text supra. 
42. Neither the brief for the appellant Swiderski nor for the government discussed 
the hypothetical. 
43. Although the hypothetical does not present enough facts to justify an unequivocal 
conclusion that the students were joint possessors of the marijuana, such a conclusion is 
apparently reasonable. First, the students shared a close association with each other, not 
being mere strangers. Second, the students had a joint proprietary interest in the locale 
where the contraband was found. Third, they likely had shared in the expense of purchas- 
ing the illicit drug. Fourth, the students knowingly shared and possessed the marijuana. 
Fifth, they were in close proximity to the contraband. It  should, however, be noted that 
the hypothetical makes no specific mention of simultaneous acquisition. 
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ished solely on the basis of their possession and not for the act of 
passing drugs to each other, the instant holding has the effect of 
formally legitimizing the physical exchange of drugs between 
joint purchasers. This holding goes further than does the mari- 
juana amendment, for example, which metes out punishment for 
both the illegal possession of any amount of marijuana as well as 
for the act of passing a small amount of marijuana to another for 
no rem~nerat ion.~~ 
Congress passed the 1970 Act in the spirit of ending loopholes 
or exceptions that had developed under some of the pre-1970 drug 
laws." Interestingly, the instant case may represent the judicial 
creation of one of the first exceptions to the Act. The holding 
represents the first time since enactment of the current law that 
a federal court has legalized the act of passing a controlled drug 
between individuals." By so holding, the court's decision conflicts 
with a basic congressional policy underlying passage of the 1970 
Act-to stop and severely punish the unauthorized movement of 
all illegal drugs between  individual^.^' 
Beyond doubtfully following congressional intent, the court's 
opinion creates some problems for its future application. The 
court protects a newly defined group from felony prosecution, i. e. ,  
those who jointly and simultaneously acquire drugs with the in- 
tent to only share among themselves. On the other hand, one who 
acquires drugs but who later gratuitously shares the contraband 
with others would be guilty of felony distribution? It is question- 
able, however, whether there is a sufficient difference in the rela- 
tive culpability and criminality of the two groups to justify classi- 
fying the first group as misdemeanants and the second as felons. 
If the Second Circuit's view is followed, however, such will be the 
case. 
Further, in this case the Second Circuit pioneered new terri- 
tory in federal narcotics law by distinguishing distribution from 
mere possession on the basis of a "simultaneous acquisition" of 
44. See 21 U.S.C. $ 4  841(b)(4), 844 (1970). 
45. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, a t  6, reprinted at 4571 (emphasis added): "The bill 
is designed to meet problems that have arisen under existing narcotic and dangerous drug 
laws due to recent governmental reorganization, court rulings, and the changing posture 
of the drug problem facing this country." 
46. The act of passing controlled drugs between individuals was legal in some circum- 
stances under the pre-1970 drug laws that turned on concepts of purchase and sale rather 
than distribution. See United States v. Pruitt, 487 F.2d 1241, 1245 (8th Cir. 1973); United 
States v. Hernandez, 480 F.2d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 1973). 
47. See notes 9-12 and accompanying text supra. 
48. See 548 F.2d at 450-51. 
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illicit drugs. Since the defendants simultaneously acquired pos- 
session, the court observed, they could not distribute the illicit 
drugs among themselves. In failing to define the key phrase 
"simultaneous acquisition," however, the court has invited future 
attempts to tamper with its judicially created exception to the 
definition of statutory distribution. 
The defendants in the instant case, who apparently acquired 
actual possession simultaneously, or nearly so, 49 were protected 
by the court's holding. But arguably the court's rationale also 
shields from felony prosecution one who obtains actual possession 
of illegal drugs and later shares the drugs with a partner who is 
considered to have acquired constructive possession simulta- 
neously with the actual possessor. As long as both the actual and 
constructive possessors intend to later share the drugs solely be- 
tween themselves, the actual possessor may not be deemed to 
have distributed the drugs to his partner. When two such persons 
are in a principal-agent relationship, the Second Circuit sug- 
gested that the agent acquiring the physical possession should be 
subjected to a felony charge.50 Yet, in such cases where there is 
simultaneous actual possession by the procuring agent and con- 
structive possession by the principal, the letter, if not the spirit, 
of the court's test to qualify for the exception is fulfilled. Accord- 
ing to the court, it is a legal impossibility for one to "distribute" 
drugs to another who already possesses them, and such possession 
would seem to include constructive as well as actual possession. 
Although the court conceded that the aim of Congress was 
to eliminate the procuring agent defense, it has nevertheless 
opened the way for procuring agents to assert a defense against a 
charge of distribution or intent to distribute. Should the court's 
view prevail, however, that the agent is guilty of a felony, again 
it would be difficult to discern a substantive difference between 
the relative criminality of the agent's acts and those of the de- 
fendants in the instant case. 
Moreover, the court created a new "link in the chain of distri- 
bution" test to define distribution. Such a test, being circular in 
nature, is obviously not free from misunderstanding. The use of 
49. The court's opinion does not indicate how strict of an interpretation the word 
"simultaneous" should carry. Whether the court means that the two defendants must 
acquire actual possession at the exact same moment in time is not clear. 
In another area of the law dealing with estates and probate, the word "simultaneous" 
has taken a very strict meaning. See In re Estate of Rowley, 257 Cal. App. 2d 324, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 139 (1967) (woman killed 1/150,00Oth of a second before another woman in the same 
car accident deemed not to have died simultaneously). 
50. 548 F.2d at 451. 
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such an ill-defined test may well create difficulties in future 
cases. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court's opinion in the instant case was based almost 
exclusively on one interpretation of congressional intent behind 
the passage of the 1970 Act. The holding, however, is markedly 
contrary to the apparent congressional intent as exemplified in 
the House Report hypothetical, the marijuana amendment, and 
other congressional language. Aside from the issue of congres- 
sional intent, the holding creates obstacles to its practical appli- 
cation and creates the risk of unwarranted expansion. 
The simplest and most easily applied interpretation of the 
Act would be to consider every exchange of a controlled drug 
between individuals to be a distribution. Following this approach 
would not be as harsh as some may think since the penalty struc- 
ture does not mandate any minimum sentences for those con- 
victed of possession or distribution offenses, therefore allowing 
great flexibility in sentencing based on the relative culpability of 
the accused." Following the Second Circuit approach, however, 
would invite future judicial exceptions and would risk a greater 
probability of unfairness in the treatment of violators based on 
where and when a drug is acquired and at  what point the intent 
to share is conceived. Furthermore, the Act's flexible penalty 
structure allows for a fairer differentiation between the relative 
degrees of misconduct of violators than does manipulating the 
definition of distribution. 
Michael L. Hutchings 
51. The collateral consequences resulting from a felony conviction, as opposed to a 
misdemeanor conviction, may be significant, however. 
